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differences between client and supplier [38; 44]. This is not
surprising as ISO projects involve actors from different countries
and cultures, working together in complex, intensive, and
dynamic activities that require close cooperation and coordination
[27]. In particular, many risks associated with ISO projects, such
as blocked knowledge transfer, differences in the interpretation of
processes, barriers between individuals, and lack of acceptance of
foreign behaviors, they all may result from cultural distance [10].

ABSTRACT
To our best knowledge, this is the first quantitative study on the
impact of the supplier‘s national culture on the client‘s choice of
control modes in IS offshoring projects. A survey-based field
study was conducted, using a client-supplier matched pair as the
unit of analysis. This approach allowed for the examination of the
direct control relationship within 46 unique matched pairs. The
study results offer empirical evidence that the supplier‘s national
culture (i.e., power distance and time perception) affects the
client‘s choice of controls in IS offshoring projects. However, the
supplier‘s cultural background seems to play a less important role
than suggested by prior research. These results (1) adapt previous
research to the IS offshoring context, (2) enhance prior findings
by establishing a more detailed understanding about the cultural
influence on the exercise of controls as well as by confirming the
significance of project size–an influencing factor that has
previously shown mixed results, and (3) incorporate new
constructs and measures in developing an integrated model that
should be broadly applicable to other IS project contexts.

One powerful approach for managing client-supplier relationships
in ISO projects is exercising control [27; 28], which refers to any
attempt to motivate individuals to behave in a manner consistent
with organizational objectives [21]. Because ISO ―entails complex
issues of geographical, cultural, and lingual differences‖, Rustagi
et al. ([45], p. 139) stress the need for research on control in ISO.
Here, especially the client‘s control over the supplier is an
important instrument to ensure project success [9]. However, the
use of control is complicated by cultural differences which impact
the coordination of the supplier employees as well as the
cooperation with them [59]. In a recent study it was found that
espoused cultural values, such as norms, values, and beliefs, affect
control choices [28]. In another study, Beck et al. [3] found that
formal project management and control mechanisms are mainly
driven by the cultural intelligence of the client‘s ISO project
manager. High cultural intelligence might lead to a better
understanding of the controllee‘s cultural values and thus enables
her/him to better select and execute suitable modes of control [3].
It is thus important to examine how the supplier‘s national culture
affects the client‘s exercise of controls in ISO projects.

Keywords
IS offshoring, control theory, managerial control, national culture,
cultural dimensions, matched pair survey, partial least squares.

1. INTRODUCTION
IS offshoring (ISO), defined as the relocation of IS services to a
captive or third party organization in a foreign, mostly low-wage
country [42] continues to be an important global trend [25]. ISO
promises many benefits, such as cost reduction, access to highly
skilled professionals, and time-to-market reduction (e.g., [42]).

Previous literature has already acknowledged the important role of
national culture in ISO in general (e.g., [38]). However, two gaps
are still obvious: First, IS outsourcing and ISO research is still
primarily based on anecdotal evidence using qualitative
(interpretive) case studies as main research method [57]. Thus,
there is still a need to validate and complement these important
findings by quantitative analyses. Second, so far there has been no
empirical study which has examined the influence of national
culture on the choice of control modes. Although Narayanaswamy
and Henry [37] proposed an initial set of propositions regarding
the relationship between three of Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions
and control modes used in offshore-outsourced IS development
projects, they did not empirically test these propositions. This
study seeks to fill these gaps by examining how the client‘s
selection of controls relates to the supplier‘s national culture. We
address this question by developing a research model which

Despite the manifold benefits, companies‘ ISO experiences have
not been consistently positive and often ISO projects fail [1].
These project failures can often be traced back to national cultural
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integrates control theory with prior literature on ISO and national
culture. To test our model, we perform a survey-based field study
using a client-supplier matched pair as the unit of analysis.

Furthermore, in an ISO project the supplier project manager may
be controlled by the client and, in turn, may control the supplier
project team members. However, for the specific focus of this
study, the distinction between controller (in terms of an individual
in the client organization) and controllee (in terms of an individual
in the supplier organization) remains largely valid.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Culture Theory

The behavioral view of control presumes that the controller uses
certain mechanisms to exercise four modes of control, which may
broadly be divided into formal and informal controls [27].

In this study, we adopt the value-based definition proposed by
Hofstede [18]. He defines culture as ―the collective programming
of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or
category of people from another‖ (p. 11). This definition describes
culture as a set of value patterns that are shared by individuals and
influence how they behave (e.g., [18; 55]). Values refer to
relationships among abstract categories that are characterized by
strong affective components and imply a preference for a certain
type of action [22]. They provide individuals with fundamental
assumptions about how things are. Based on these assumptions,
researchers attempt to generalize the patterns of different cultures
into several dimensions. The defined cultural dimensions provide
a framework to measure and compare the cultural differences
from one country (or group) to another [43].

There are two modes of formal control: behavior and outcome
control [13]. In behavior control, the controller seeks to influence
the process to achieve the desired outputs by explicitly prescribing
specific rules and procedures, monitoring their implementation,
and rewarding the controllee based on the extent to which the
implementation complies with these rules and procedures [26].
This is achieved through the use of mechanisms that either specify
appropriate behaviors, or allow for the evaluation of the
controllee‘s behavior [27]. In outcome control, only the outputs
(both interim and final) are measured and evaluated. Here, the
controller explicitly defines specific goals and rewards the
controllee for meeting these goals [13; 27]. Outcome control is
exercised through mechanisms that specify or measure desired
outcomes [9].

ISO is situated within a complex and multi-leveled socio-cultural
context, which comprises not only the national (societal) level but
also organizational, professional (functional), team, or individual
levels [22]. Thus, national culture may not be the only type of
culture which influences the choice of control. However, cultural
differences on the national level are presumed to constitute a
predominant factor influencing ISO project control [33]. Wilkins
and Ouchi [58] argue, for instance, that ―the learning of
organizational ‗culture‘ [is] neither as deep nor as immutable as
the anthropological metaphor would suggest‖ (p. 479). We believe
that this rationale also applies to the professional and team level
of culture.

Informal control modes are clan and self-control. Clan control
refers to mechanisms that minimize the differences between the
controller and controllee‘s objectives [13] by ―promulgating
common values, beliefs, and philosophy within a clan, which is
defined as a group of individuals who are dependent on one
another and who share a set of common goals‖ ([27], p. 217).
According to this definition, it is questionable whether the clan
control construct can be applied to ISO projects as the clientsupplier relationship is assumed to be adversarial [32]. Thus, we
adopt a different interpretation of clan control ―refer[ring] to a
situation in which the traditional relationship is replaced by a
scenario where the two organizations perceive themselves as
having a common, shared goal‖ ([9], p. 293). Unlike clan control,
self-control is a function of intrinsic motivation [36] as well as
individual standards and objectives [21]. Even though controllees
control themselves by their own actions (e.g., setting their own
goals) [26], the controller can use control mechanisms to assist
and promote the exercise of self-control by the controllee.

Even though culture is seen a collective phenomenon and, thus,
irreducible to the individual level of analysis it can only manifest
itself through the individual [50]. We therefore argue ―that
individuals espouse national cultural values to different degrees‖,
treating these values as an individual difference variable ([48], p.
680). This perspective allows us to analyze cultural differences on
different levels without presuming an aggregated type of culture
on the national level. By disaggregating the monolithic national
culture construct into its espoused value dimensions it is possible
to use it as individual difference construct in individual-level
research such as control theory. As a result, it is possible to
capture the nuances and distinct effects of the relationship
between each cultural value and control, which otherwise treated
as monolithic construct could have been shown as culturally
invariant [48].

Controllers often use the four control modes in combination,
creating a portfolio of controls [21; 27]. Within a portfolio, each
control mode can itself be implemented through multiple control
mechanisms [27]. The choice of controls is influenced by different
factors in the project, stakeholder, and global contexts [27; 28].
Factors related to the global context include priority differences
among stakeholders from different countries, as well as
geographic, time zone, and cultural differences. In this context, it
is the cultural factors influencing the choice of controls that are
still not well understood. These relationships are discussed in
more detail in the following section.

2.2 Control Theory
Our study adopts a behavioral view of control. This view implies
that the controller takes some action in order to regulate or adjust
the behavior of the controllee [26], and draws upon organization
and agency theories consistent with prior studies in IS (e.g., [9;
26; 27; 28; 29]), organization design (e.g., [13]), and marketing
(e.g., [21]).

3. RESEARCH MODEL AND
HYPOTHESES

A control situation typically involves an individual exercising
control (the controller) and a target of control (the controllee)
[28]. However, this distinction sometimes becomes fuzzy [9], in
particular in an ISO context. For instance, the controller and the
controllee may not be individuals but teams of individuals
representing their organizational unit or organization respectively.

Our research model considers the relationship between the
controller‘s choice of controls and the controllee‘s national
culture. The model draws on five cultural dimensions which can
be used to define national culture. Here, however, we do not focus
on the cultural characteristics of specific nations. Instead, we
attempt to understand how the characteristics of the underlying

852

Supplier (Controllee) Culture

Power Distance

H1 (+)

H2 (-)

Clan Control

Uncertainty
Avoidance

Collectivism

H3 (+)

H4 (-)

H5 (-)

Activity

H6 (+)

Self-Control

H7 (-)

Behavior Control

Monochronicity

H8 (+)

H9 (-)

H10 (+)

Outcome Control

Client (Controller) Choice of Controls

Figure 1. Research model
espoused cultural values interact with ISO project control [14;
48]. Figure 1 shows the different constructs and hypotheses.

and internalization effects [23], although this might be difficult to
achieve unless they are part of a long-term alliance [9].

According to Carmel [6], cultural dimensions are useful in
modeling culture-related issues in globally distributed projects.
From the variety of dimensional models existing at the national
level, the following five dimensions were selected: power
distance, individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance [18],
activity/passivity [35; 52], and mono-/polychronic time perception
[16]. The selected dimensions were evaluated in terms of their
suitability to explain cultural characteristics that may affect the
choice of different control modes in ISO projects. For example
Hofstede‘s masculinity/femininity dimension was dropped as it
seems to be highly correlated to age [14]. Some of these
dimensions have already been applied to ISO-related research,
including power distance [59], individualism/collectivism [59],
uncertainty avoidance [49], and activity/passivity [59]. In
addition, the model was enhanced by the dimension mono-/
polychronicity because different views about timelines, deadlines,
work rhythms, and/or punctuality may impose challenges to the
coordination (and control) of globally distributed projects [46].

H1: The higher the controllee’s power distance the greater the
exercise of clan control.

3.1 Power Distance

Individualism is defined as the extent to which people prefer to
act as individuals rather than as members of groups [18]. In
individualistic cultures the ties between individuals are loose.
They value personal time and personal accomplishments. In
contrast, in collectivistic cultures group goals and interests are
more important than individual desires, and people are integrated
into strong, cohesive groups.

On the other hand, as individuals feel self-motivated and more
productive when there is less intervention by the managers, selfcontrol is also likely to be used. This calls for less formal control
substituted by self-control, defined as controllee-driven
noncontrolling [51]. This is reinforced by the issue that in
offshore projects, control of behavior is more difficult and is often
facilitated and supplemented indirectly by means of self-control
[51]. In this situation the controller encourages the controllee to
use self-control or even exerts informal social pressure to use clan
control [26; 9]. The controllee, then in his role as controller is
encouraged to use the more difficult formal controls, such as
outcome or behavioral control on his (supplier) team [9].
H2: The lower the controllee’s power distance the greater the
exercise of self-control.

3.2 Individualism/Collectivism

Power distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful
members of institutions and organizations within a society expect
and accept that power is distributed unequally. In high power
distance cultures superiors make decisions without consultation
with subordinates. Employees are fearful of disagreeing with their
superiors and expect to be told what to do. For example, it was
found that in rather high power distance cultures like India,
offshore team members have difficulty in saying no [38; 59]. In
contrast, in cultures that are low in power distance, relationships
between superiors and subordinates are more participative and
egalitarian and subordinates are likely to contradict their superiors
directly and do not expect to be told what to do [17]. They also
participate more in decision making activities and prefer a
consultative relationship with their superiors [17].

In a study on collectivistic and individualistic work groups, Earley
[12] found that collectivistic individuals show higher performance
when working in an in-group (i.e., a group they identify with), as
compared to collectivistic individuals who work by themselves or
as part of an out-group (i.e., a group they do not identify with). In
collectivistic societies the focus seems to be more on how well
subordinates follow prescribed processes instead of assessing
merely the outcomes [54]. In particular, social norms, duties, and
obligations guide team members‘ behavior, and group (clan) goals
seem to have priority [54]. Another aspect is that collectivistic
employees view their relationship with the employer in moral
terms. They tend to have a strong sense of identity with and
loyalty to their organization. Consequently, they will strive to
achieve outcomes that are in the organization‘s best interest and
will do so with little expectation of personal gain. The controllee
team will assume joint responsibility and/or receive joint
recognition for actions taken or decisions made [55]. They also

In particular, in high power distance cultures the controllee feels
less comfortable in debating and contradicting. They tend to pay
more attention to the opinions of others and thus tend to be more
attuned to social norms [48], typically facilitated by clan control.
Here, clan control mechanisms, such as rituals, ceremonies and
socialization might mitigate the difference in objectives between
controller and controllee [9], triggering compliance, identification

853

see self-development occurring through harmony and reciprocity
in interpersonal relations and contributing to the welfare of other
group members [56]. Hence, implementing control through a
process of socialization and promoting interpersonal dynamics to
create shared beliefs will harmonize the values and beliefs among
the team members [37]. Often, collectivistic cultures prefer
training and other learning opportunities [54], all indications that
clan control would be an appropriate choice of control [39].

3.4 Activity/Passivity
The activity-passivity dimension is defined as the ―extent to
which individuals in a culture see themselves as doers (active
shapers of the world) or beers (passive reactors to the world)‖
([35], p. 178). In passive cultures people change themselves to fit
into the environment. They are more cooperative, emphasize the
experience of living, and are especially concerned with getting
along with others [53]. In a recent study it was found that offshore
teams from low activity cultures, such as India, prefer to have
precisely described software specification and were described as
―rather passive reactors to pre-specified tasks and methodologies‖
([59], p. 249). Moreover, the Indian developers didn‘t appreciate
open team meetings in which they were urged to actively
participate in discussions related to wider project-relevant topics
[59]. This would rather exclude clan and self-control as viable
control options and instead suggest more directive forms of
management, i.e., guiding the controllee through the process [52].

H3: The higher the controllee’s collectivism the greater the
exercise of clan control.
On the other side, it is expected that in highly collectivistic
cultures individuals will keep individuals and organization's
interests and goals in line because they expect personal reward
and recognition for their decisions [55]. Thus, providing
individuals with autonomy will help them to monitor their own
progress towards achieving common goals. This would favor the
use of self-control, defined as a function of individual objectives
and standards and intrinsic motivation [26; 9]. As motivated in
―Power Distance‖, the encouragement of self-control might
indirectly help to implement more difficult formal control modes,
such as behavior control on the supplier side.

H7: The lower the controllee’s activity the greater the exercise of
behavior control.
In contrast, in active cultures individuals try to change the
environment to fit them; active cultures are more competitive,
action-oriented, and emphasize self-fulfillment. Furthermore, in
more active cultures autonomy to complete requested tasks is
emphasized as well as fitting to goal-oriented work environments,
suggesting the use of outcome control and more liberal methods
of management to be effective [52].

H4: The lower the controllee’s collectivism the greater the
exercise of self-control.

3.3 Uncertainty Avoidance
This dimension describes the extent to which the members of a
culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations.
Individuals with low uncertainty avoidance believe that problems
can be solved without formal rules [37]. They do not seem to be
dependent on experts and prefer a less structured and rule-oriented
environment [17]. They prefer rules only in situations of absolute
necessity. Thus, providing a high degree of autonomy by means of
self-control will increase project performance [37].

H8: The higher the controllee’s activity the greater the exercise of
outcome control.

3.5 Mono-/Polychronicity
Individuals with polychronic time perception are involved in
many different activities with different people at the same time
[24]. They view time commitment only as an objective to achieve
when possible and make changes to plans when needed [16]. They
feel that getting to know their counterparts and building a
relationship is more important than adhering to a preset schedule.
Here, monitoring the process may be required to assure
compliance with project schedules [9].

H5: The lower the controllee’s uncertainty avoidance the greater
the exercise of self-control.
On the other hand, a culture high in uncertainty avoidance would
exhibit rule orientation, prefer employment stability, and exhibit
stress when trying to explain, mitigate and minimize the
uncertainty that is inherent to life [48]. Often, controllees with
high uncertainty avoidance are dependent on experts and superiors
for answers and feel secure with defined behaviors [37], thus
feeling more comfortable with tight behavior controls. In addition,
high uncertainty avoidance is associated with close
communication, posing questions, feedback and reassurance,
increasing the controller‘s understanding of appropriate behaviors
as controllees might be more willing to reveal their actual work
behaviors. The understanding of behavior is in turn crucial for
introducing behavioral controls [37] as it is associated with higher
behavior measurability. It has been found that, in particular high
behavior observability facilitates behavior control [26; 27]. This
finding was recently refined by Kirsch et al. [29] who concluded
that high behavior observability is associated with the use of
either behavior control (if the controller is knowledgeable) or clan
control (if the controller has low knowledge). In particular, as the
controller‘s technical knowledge is likely to be higher in
outsourced/offshored projects there is a tendency for the controller
to use more behavior control [51].

H9: The less monochronic the controllee’s time perception the
greater the exercise of behavior control.
In contrast, individuals with monochronic time perception do only
one thing at a time, take time and deadlines seriously, and adhere
to preset schedules. For them, time is structured, linear, and
sequential [16]. They set agendas for meetings and adhere to
preset schedules. They schedule negotiations in ways that create
psychological pressure in having to arrive at a decision by a
certain date [16].
H10: The more monochronic the controllee’s time perception the
greater the exercise of outcome control.

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To test the hypothesized relationships in our research model, we
developed matched-pair survey instruments. Most prior research
in IS outsourcing/offshoring has collected data from either clients
or vendors [45]. However, Koh et al. [31] found that stakeholder
perspectives differ in such arrangements. Consequently, we
collected data from both clients and suppliers. Clients were
surveyed on their use of different control modes within the
examined project and general project characteristics. Suppliers
responded to items about their national culture. In addition, clients

H6: The higher the controllee’s uncertainty avoidance the greater
the exercise of behavior control.
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and suppliers provided information about their position and
professional experience. The use of two questionnaires
significantly reduces the risks of common source bias [30].

the questionnaire, resulting in a response rate of 98 percent. In
order to form one data record for each matched pair, the matching
client and supplier data records were joined based on the included
ID. Two non-paired data records were dropped from the analysis,
resulting in a sample size of 46 unique matched pairs. A
comparison of the data of early returned questionnaires with that
of later returned ones showed no indication of non-response error.
Furthermore, the wide range of responses to our survey items
indicates a lower risk of non-response bias [45].

4.1 Data Collection
To ensure the quality of the survey data, projects and respondents
had to satisfy three criteria for inclusion in the sample. First, ISO
projects either had to be completed for not more than twelve
months, or had to be underway for at least three months and
already reached one milestone. This ensured that included projects
had progressed to a reasonable maturity [45] and that significant
activities had recently occurred [30], increasing the reliability of
the participants‘ perceptions and answers. Second, projects had to
allow access to both a client representative and her/his supplier
counterpart. For each selected project, completed survey
instruments from one matching pair were required. Third, the
client and supplier members of a dyad must have had operated in
their roles for at least two months. Establishing this criterion
ensured that the dyads have had adequate time to work with each
other and to develop a relationship [45]. Furthermore, all survey
participants held key positions in their respective organizations
being responsible for managing the client-supplier relationship–a
major influence on ISO success [59].

4.2 Instrument Development
Two survey instruments were developed for this study, one for
collecting data about the dependent variables (choice of controls)
from the clients, and one for collecting data about the independent
variables (national culture) from the suppliers. Generally accepted
guidelines were followed in developing these instruments. All
latent variables were measured with multiple items. Scale items
were derived from prior research: To measure the four modes of
control, we adopted Kirsch et al.‘s [29] items for behavior,
outcome and clan control, and adapted Brief and Aldag [5],
Choudhury and Sabherwal [9], and Kirsch et al.‘s [29] items for
self-control. Measures for the cultural dimensions power distance,
individualism/collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance were
adopted from Hofstede‘s ―Values Survey Module‖ [19]. However,
scale items for the constructs activity and monochronicity were
newly developed since we were not able to identify suitable
measuring instruments. Although some scholars have
conceptualized the cultural dimensions associated with these
constructs, relatively few have attempted to measure them
directly. The new items used in this study reflect and measure key
concepts of activity and monochronicity, and are grounded in the
work of Lytle et al. [35] and Triandis [52], and Hall and Hall [16],
respectively. The three activity items assessed the controllee‘s
individual initiative to complete tasks and find solutions to
recurring issues, and her/his willingness to accept challenging
tasks. The two monochronicity items involved the adherence to
preset plans and time targets. All constructs were measured
reflectively. Except for the demographic items, all items were
rated on five-point Likert scales.

A website (http://survey.international-outsourcing.de) was
launched to host the survey instruments, accelerate
communications to respondents, and improve accuracy and
efficiency in data collection and analysis. Next to the online
questionnaire, we also prepared a paper version of our
questionnaire to eliminate coverage error [47].
We used a convenience sample to collect the survey data. To
identify appropriate ISO projects and respondents, we contacted
management executives of client and offshore supplier firms by email followed by a personal phone call. The executives were
professional acquaintances of one of the authors. This was a key
criterion for selecting these sites because it enhanced our ability to
ensure the appropriateness of the ultimate respondents [45]. If an
executive agreed to participate, she/he was asked to nominate
suitable projects and respondents and solicit the participation of
the executive of the counterpart organization. The use of this
―known sponsor approach‖ [40] often resulted in immediate
legitimacy and credibility of the research team and study. The
client and/or vendor executive then forwarded a personalized email with the study invitation to each potential respondent within
the nominated project(s). This e-mail contained the URL address
and a link to the website where the survey was available, the name
of the questionnaire to be filled in, and the unique matched pair
ID which was used to join the data records of the paired client and
supplier representatives during data analysis. The e-mail also
guaranteed the anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents,
and clearly specified the goals of the study, the potential benefits
to the participants, and the required level of participation. As an a
priori strategy to minimize non-response error and its impact on
the validity of inferences, we used Dillman‘s [11] Tailored Design
Method.

Prior research noted the effect of project size [27] and controllee‘s
domain-specific knowledge [9; 26] on control choices. Hence, we
included project size and supplier ISO knowledge as control
variables in our analysis. Project size was measured by requesting
client managers to indicate the amount of person months needed
to execute the ISO project. ISO knowledge was estimated by
asking (supplier) respondents to indicate their number of years of
experience in the ISO field on a three-point Likert scale. The
project volume and the ISO experience were used as proxies for
project size and supplier ISO knowledge, respectively.
In March 2010, we conducted a pretest with five IS practitioners
and four academics with expertise in ISO and survey methods.
Furthermore, two experienced IS faculty members reviewed the
client and supplier questionnaire and provided comments for
improvement. Following the pretest, we selected a large-scale ISO
arrangement as the site for the pilot study. This arrangement
involved a multinational client organization with annual revenues
of more than ten billion US dollars that has offshored IS services
to an Indian vendor. A total of eleven respondents participated in
the pilot study, eight client and three supplier representatives. The
pilot resulted in clarification of the unit of analysis: The clientsupplier pair rather than the ISO project. In addition, a power
distance measure was added, the wording of some measures was

Of the 18 executives who were initially requested to participate in
the study, 14 agreed, for a response rate of 78 percent. Follow-up
communications with the four non-participating executives did
not reveal any trends or reasons that would point toward a nonresponse bias. A total of 96 client and supplier project team
members were asked to participate in our study. In all, 94
respondents (46 client and 48 supplier representatives) filled in
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slightly changed, and the degree of data anonymity and
confidentiality was further emphasized. Respondents in the pilot
study were not in the main sample.

variables of a measurement model belong to the domain of the
construct [4]. This was assured by selecting well established
measures from prior research (wherever feasible), consulting
experts in a pretest, and conducting a pilot study.

5. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

(2) Item reliability: Item reliability specifies which part of an
item‘s variance can be explained by the underlying construct. If
item loadings within the PLS model are lower than 0.40 they
should be eliminated [20]. Loadings were analyzed using the PLS
path weighting scheme. A number of items were below the 0.40
threshold. On the part of the independent variables, similar to
Srite and Karahanna [48] we encountered difficulties in some of
the original culture items adopted from Hofstede‘s ―Values
Survey Module‖ [19]. The analysis indicated problems with three
power distance items, two collectivism items, two uncertainty
avoidance items, and one activity item. On the part of the
dependent variables, the generated item loadings showed
problems with three outcome control items, one clan control item,
and one self-control item. These items were removed from the
model. PLS analysis was then run again reporting high loadings
for all culture-related and control-related items (above 0.60 and
0.71, respectively), except for one behavior control item (0.53). A
generally accepted rule of thumb is that item loadings should be
greater than 0.70 [2]. However, in exploratory work loadings of
0.50 are still acceptable [8]. Thus, all items can be considered
significant.

Before testing the research model, we provide descriptive
statistics for our sample. Over a five-month period, we collected
data from a total of 36 projects from 16 client organizations. All
of these organizations operate from German-speaking countries
(12, 3, and 1 from Germany, Switzerland, and Austria,
respectively). 14 of them are large for-profit firms and two small
or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
26 projects dealt with ―applications development/testing‖; five
projects were characterized as ―applications management‖, and
two as ―IT infrastructure management (managed services)‖. The
project volume ranged from very small (less than 24 person
months) to very large (600 or more person months), with a slight
preponderance of larger projects. 33 projects involved large-scale
supplier organizations, while three projects involved SME
suppliers. 20 projects were executed with independent supplier
firms (third party vendors and global IT service providers), 15
with a subsidiary of the client firm, and one with a joint venture.
One project involved a nearshore supplier (Slovakia). In contrast,
more than 90 percent of the projects were offshored to India.
63 percent of the client representatives stated that they had more
than five years of experience in the IS field, while 96 percent
declared having more than one year of experience in the ISO field.
Almost 70 percent of the supplier representatives indicated having
more than five years of experience in both the IS and ISO field.

(3) Construct reliability: Construct reliability (or internal
consistency) indicates how well a construct is measured by its
items. It can be assessed with the composite reliability measure
[15]. As seen in the ―Fornell‖ column in Table 1, all constructs
exceed the recommended cut-off of 0.6 [15], and are thus reliable.

To test the research model, we transformed it into a structural
equation model, using the software SmartPLS. Partial least
squares (PLS) has the ability to handle relatively small sample
sizes [30], making it an appropriate choice. Basically, our data
analysis followed a two-stage process as suggested by Chin [7]
and Hulland [20]: First, we assessed the reliability and validity of
the measurement model. Second, we tested the structural model
and its hypotheses, and analyzed the effect of control variables.

(4) Convergent validity: Table 1 displays the correlations analysis
of the independent variables, the dependent variables, and the two
control variables. The boldface diagonal cells are the square root
of the average variance extracted (AVE), which is a measure of
the variance shared between a construct and its items. Each
variable has an AVE of at least 0.5, establishing convergent
validity for all scales [15].

5.1 Assessment of the Measurement Model

(5) Discriminant validity: A necessary condition for discriminant
validity is that a latent variable shares more variance with its
assigned items than with any other latent variable [15]. The offdiagonal cells in Table 1 show the correlations between the

Five criteria need to be examined to determine the adequacy of
the measurement model. These criteria are discussed below.
(1) Content validity: Content validity indicates to what extent the

Table 1. Correlations between constructs
Construct

Fornell

PD

Power Distance (PD)

0.77

0.80

CO

UA

Collectivism (CO)

0.76

-0.18

0.79

Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)

0.75

0.40

-0.05

0.78

Activity (AC)

0.78

-0.04

-0.23

0.05

0.81

Monochronicity (MO)

0.67

0.23

-0.04

0.38

0.30

0.71

Behavior Control (BC)

0.65

0.26

-0.06

0.06

0.16

0.41

0.71

Outcome Control (OC)

0.83

-0.29

-0.29

-0.13

0.37

0.14

0.13

0.84

Clan Control (CC)

0.80

0.39

0.12

-0.01

0.13

-0.02

0.38

-0.05

0.76

Self-Control (SC)

0.83

-0.29

-0.16

-0.24

0.14

0.00

0.05

0.22

0.04

Project Size (PS)

1.00

-0.09

-0.01

-0.05

0.02

-0.33

-0.42

-0.07

0.02

0.03

1.00

ISO Knowledge (IK)

1.00

-0.11

-0.10

-0.13

0.09

-0.08

-0.13

0.06

-0.38

-0.14

0.10
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AC

MO

BC

OC

CC

SC

PS

IK

0.79
1.00

constructs. The diagonal values are significantly greater than the
off-diagonal values in the corresponding rows and columns,
indicating discriminant validity for all scales [20]. Additionally,
each within-construct item loads highly on the construct it is
supposed to measure, and cross-loadings are lower than the
within-construct item loadings.

Table 2 gives a detailed overview of the hypotheses test results.
Approximately 30 percent (R² = 0.298) of the variance in clan
control, 19 percent (R² = 0.192) of the variance in self-control, 28
percent (R² = 0.278) of the variance in behavior control, and 15
percent (R² = 0.145) of the variance in outcome control are
explained by the model. Ranging from 0.287 to 0.387, all path
coefficients of the supported hypotheses clearly exceeded the
suggested minimum value of significance at 0.20 [7]. Therefore,
the fit of the overall model is deemed to be good [30].

5.2 Assessment of the Structural Model
The assessment of the inner model involves estimating the path
coefficients and the R²-values. Path coefficients specify the
strengths of the relationships between the independent and
dependent variables, while the R²-value is a measure of the
predictive power of a model for the dependent variables [30]. A
bootstrap resampling method (1.000 re-samples) was used to
determine the significance of the paths within the structural
model. The sample size of 46 matched pairs exceeded the
recommended minimum of 30 data records, which is ten times the
largest number of independent variables influencing dependent
variables in the structural model [2].

The controllees‘ ISO knowledge and project size were included in
the model as control variables. For both variables, one
relationship with a dependent construct was found to be
significant: ISO knowledge lowers the exercise of clan control (b
= -0.333; t = 2.463; p < 0.05); project size is negatively associated
with the use of behavior control (b = -0.310; t = 1.756; p < 0.10).

6. DISCUSSION
Before discussing the study results and their implications, some of
the key limitations have to be mentioned. First, only a moderate
sample size of 46 matched pairs was achieved. This sample size
could potentially limit the power of the statistical techniques.
Second, the findings of this study may be specific to ISO
arrangements between Germany and India as the majority of the
participating controllees were Indian, while most controllers were
German. Third, the extent or amount to which the four control
modes were exercised was not examined. Forth, this study only
provides insight into the client‘s choice of controls. Hence, it does
not examine the mechanisms used internally by the supplier.
Finally, there are also limitations specific to measuring cultural
values on the individual level that apply to all culture studies. As
such, there is a concern that some of these cultural values are
subtle and implicit and as such cannot easily be reported [48].

H1 and H2 pertain to power distance. As expected, power distance
is significantly related with the exercise of clan control (b = 0.387;
t = 2.426; p < 0.05) and self-control (b = -0.287; t = 1.743; p <
0.10). Both paths have effects in the predicted directions,
supporting H1 and H2. Collectivism does not significantly affect
the choice of informal controls (clan and self-control). Thus, H3
and H4 are not supported. H5 suggests a negative relationship
between uncertainty avoidance and the use of self-control. H6
proposes a positive effect of uncertainty avoidance on the exercise
of behavior control. However, both hypotheses are not significant.
H7, which hypothesizes a negative relationship between activity
and behavior control, as well as H8, which assumes a positive
effect between activity and outcome control, are not significant,
either. The latter path almost reached the critical t-value of 1.66
(b= 0.368, t = 1.484), and might therefore be worthwhile for
further investigation in future research. Contrary to expectations,
monochronicity has a significant and positive relationship with
behavior control (b = 0.310; t = 1.751; p < 0.10). This finding is in
the opposite direction of the relationship hypothesized (H9) and
suggests that if the controllee‘s monochronic time perception is
high, the controller‘s exercise of behavior control is also high, and
vice versa. Finally, monochronicity is not significantly associated
with the use of outcome control. Thus, H10 is not supported.

Before discussing the cultural value dimensions showing positive
effects on control modes, we provide a brief discussion of the non
significant relationships.
Collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and activity don‘t show
significant relationships to any of the four control modes. Please
note that the path from activity to outcome control is just below
the significance threshold of 1.66. Obviously, ISO project
managers don‘t pay particular attention to these three dimensions

Table 2. Hypotheses test results
Hypothesis

Standardized Path
Coefficient (b)

t-Value
for Path

p-Value
(two-tailed)

 H1

Power Distance  Clan Control (+)

0.387

2.426

0.05



H2

Power Distance  Self-Control (-)

-0.287

1.743

0.10

X

H3

Collectivism  Clan Control (+)

0.162

1.036

X

H4

Collectivism  Self-Control (-)

-0.239

1.014

X

H5

Uncertainty Avoidance  Self-Control (-)

-0.169

0.947

X

H6

Uncertainty Avoidance  Behavior Control (+)

-0.086

0.524

X

H7

Activity  Behavior Control (-)

0.088

0.365

X

H8

Activity  Outcome Control (+)

0.368

1.484



H9

Monochronicity  Behavior Control (-)

0.310

1.751

X

H10

Monochronicity  Outcome Control (+)

0.004

0.025

"" indicates significant relationship; "x" indicates not significant relationship
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0.10

when selecting their portfolio of control. Several explanations
might account for this finding. First, it is possible that controllers
do not care about the cultural values associated with these
dimensions. Second, it might be particularly difficult to identify
and observe these three cultural dimensions at the supplier‘s side.
It might well be that these values are hidden as they are more tacit
and deeply engrained [48]. Hence, the controller cannot take into
account these cultural values when selecting appropriate controls.
Finally, there could also be mediation effects between these
cultural values and control choices responsible for these nonsignificant results. For example, behavior measurability could be
mediating the relationship between uncertainty avoidance and
control. Here, individuals with high uncertainty cultural values are
more willing to reveal their actual behavior, a prerequisite for
high behavior measurability, which in turn is associated with the
use of either behavior control (if the controller is knowledgeable)
or clan control (if the controller has low knowledge) [29].

excessive or detrimental concurrence or human factors that
amplify the negative effects via channels such as morale. Here,
the use of less tight controls (e.g., outcome controls) might make
monochronic controllees feel unsecure (ripple effect), decreasing
their productivity (knock-on effect). Controllers anticipating these
(negative) side effects might thus try to exercise more behavior
control for monochronic controllees and, in turn, less behavior
control for more polychronic controllees.

6.3 Project Size
Our results show that project size has a significant negative
relationship with behavior control, such that the lower the project
size the greater the exercise of behavior control. There is a
plausible possible for this. Smaller projects are better controllable
by means of behavior control as behavior observability is higher
compared to larger, more complex projects, thus increasing the
option to use behavior control. This extends the findings of
Choudhury and Sabherwal [9], who didn‘t find a significant
impact of project size on the choice of controls in outsourcing
projects, and it may well be that their anecdotal evidence from
five cases didn‘t allow generalization to a larger population of
ISO projects. Our findings also contradict the findings of Jaworski
[21], who found that larger projects prefer more formal control.
However Jaworski didn‘t specify the mode of formal control so it
is not clear whether this also included behavior control.

6.1 Power Distance
Power distance was found to have a significant impact on
informal control modes. This finding supports our hypotheses
such that the higher the controllee‘s power distance the greater the
exercise of clan control and the lower the controllee‘s power
distance the greater the exercise of self-control.
Obviously, in high power distance cultures controllers take into
account the controllees‘ predispositions such as that employees
are fearful of disagreeing with their superiors and expect to be
told what to do. They thus select clan control mechanisms, such as
rituals, ceremonies and socialization to mitigate the difference in
objectives between them and the controllees [9]. As controllees
are more attuned by social norms [48] it is likely that they are
more reachable by clan control.

6.4 Supplier ISO Knowledge
The path between supplier ISO knowledge and clan control shows
a significant negative relationship between these two, such that
the lower the supplier‘s ISO knowledge the greater the use of clan
control. This significant effect has not yet been articulated in past
research. In general, there is agreement that the choice of controls
further depends on the knowledge of the stakeholders [28]. In
particular, a knowledgeable controllee makes the controller feel
more confident in using self- or outcome control [26]. Even
though we used ISO experience (number of years) as proxy for
ISO knowledge, our results shed more light into the role of
supplier experience (and thus knowledge) for using clan control.

On the other hand, our finding also confirms that self-control is a
feasible option for low power distance cultures and a less
favorable option for high power distance cultures. Typically, in
high power distance cultures controllees ask for guidance. As a
result, controllers are less likely to use control mechanisms that
require high levels of autonomy and self-management. This
finding is important because it further supports findings from
prior literature that already proclaimed the important role of
power distance in the context of ISO (e.g., [41; 59]).

Apparently, for less experienced controllees, controllers tend to
rely on clan control, although in distant offshore relationships
implementing clan control can be very costly. Exercising clan
control by participating in project team meetings requires
considerable time and commitment. However, it might well be
that clan control is still the only feasible option or supplements
well other more formal control mechanisms. On the other hand, if
controllees are highly experienced, often these costly clan controls
may not be necessary to this extend.

In general, our findings emphasize the importance of informal
controls with regard to the power distance value, may it be as
complementary to formal control, or as dominant control mode.

6.2 Monochronicity
Our results confirmed a significant relationship between
monochronicity and behavior control but in the opposite direction
as hypothesized, such that the more monochronic the controllee‘s
time perception the greater the exercise of behavior control. This
result is counterintuitive. Several explanations are possible. First,
the rationale for our hypothesis rested on Choudhury and
Sabherwal‘s [9] finding that in an outsourcing context, tight
behavioral controls are preferable in order to meet project
schedules. This finding is based on anecdotal evidence from five
cases, and thus might be specific to the particular context in these
cases. Second, there is also evidence that control that counteract
behavior may lead to typical resistance behavior, causing so called
―ripple and knock-on effects‖ [34]. Ripple effects are primary side
effects of well-intentioned control efforts, whereas knock-on
effects show ―secondary impacts of project control efforts, i.e., the
impacts of ripple effects, often caused by processes that produce

7. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Our research aims to contribute to the ISO and control literature in
several ways. First, our results enhance prior findings by
establishing a more detailed understanding about the influence of
the supplier‘s cultural values on the exercise of control. Second,
we were able to confirm the significance of two control variables,
such as project size and the supplier‘s ISO knowledge. In
particular project size has so far shown mixed results [27; 9].
Third, we incorporated and successfully applied new measures for
self-control and developed new items for the constructs activity
and monochronicity.
Our results also have important implications for practice. In
general, our results suggest that informal controls are a powerful
managerial tool for steering ISO projects. In particular, our view
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of self-control (i.e., mechanisms the controller uses to assist and
promote the exercise of self-control by the controllee) has
interesting implications: Self-control could be used as a means to
implement more difficult formal controls for less motivated,
difficult to control and dependent controllees. For instance,
control of the supplier team members‘ behavior can be indirectly
achieved by means of self-control through the supplier‘s project
manager who acts as controller for her/his supplier team [51].
Furthermore, our results suggest that when ISO client managers
select their portfolio of control they should consider the cultural
values of their supplier counterparts, may they be ―easy to
observe‖ (power distance) or more ―hidden‖ (collectivism,
uncertainty avoidance, and activity). Finally, our research sheds
new light on the importance of cultural trainings [59]. Trainings
focusing on cultural values could effectively improve cultural
intelligence, thereby enabling client project managers to better
determine culture-specific elements of behavior [3], which in turn
is a prerequisite to select appropriate controls and to fine-tune
them.
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